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1 INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF MORE
ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE1
For decades, the debate on monetisation of project food
aid seemed closed: commodity sales and programming
of counterpart funds (the term 'monetisation' is of
recent origin) were looked upon as the attempt by
project food aid agencies to break out of their narrow
mandate - mostly vulnerable group feeding and food-
for-work - into a broader range of mainstream
development activities which required cash to be
obtained through open market sales; hence, the
tendency of major food aid donors to guard
monetisation jealously for their own bilateral pro-
grammes - in the case of WFP, donors agreed
reluctantly to a level of monetisation of 15 per cent of
total deliveries.2
This is now changing - the potential of monetisation
as a means of targeting food aid to food-insecure
households is beginning to attract attention, and
project food aid agencies are invited to develop it,
perhaps a little more audaciously than they would
themselves prefer. This came out strongly in the study
of the role of food aid in Africa which the World Bank
and WFP undertook jointly during 1989/90, and which
turned into a protracted effort because the World Bank
wished to see far higher emphasis put on monetisation
than WFP was ready to accept (World Bank/WFP
1991). WFP has so far decided to remain within its
traditional level of monetisation of 15 per cent.
However, at the IDS workshop on 'Commodity Aid
and Counterpart Funds in Africa' in January 1991, I
proposed a set of practical criteria which I thought
would help agencies like my own to choose between
monetisation and distribution in kind in the individual
case. These were modified and adopted by the
workshop (Maxwell and Owens 1991:21) and are
reproduced with further minor changes in Figure 1.
However, the checklist did not reckon with certain key
concerns of project food aid managers. This Bulletin
article will address these in greater detail. It will argue
the continuing merits and legitimacy of food
distribution in kind up to a point: if food aid is to play a
more effective role in targeted alleviation of household
food insecurity, then the traditional approach is too
Thts article represents the personal s'iews of the author, not the
official position of WFP.
2 WFP policy and experience with monetisation and the management
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limited and monetisation can open up new room for
manoeuvre.
2 THREE KEY CONSTRAINTS - THREE
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Monetisation meets with three practical constraints
which the theorists have so far failed to recognize. But
one must add three important challenges which
responsible food aid managers have yet to take on.
¡ Bureaucratic Management
The most immediate is the challenge to the
administrators which is very real: for organizations
which have, in the case of WFP for over 25 years,
learned to procure, transport and distribute food in
kind, monetisation brings with it a wide range of new
activities and responsibilities, which in turn means new
procedures, manuals, instructions, controls, reports
and for all of these initially a dangerous lack of training
and experience. Considering the inherently different
nature of administering and auditing cash instead of
food, monetisation adds to the traditional function of
project food aid agencies a whole new dimension, for
which there is so far no solid bureaucratic routine. To
create one in the present environment (shrinking
resources, often critical staff constraints, preoccupation
with a wide-ranging general debate on the future of
project food aid) is a formidable task indeed. This is the
first aspect of the problem which the advocates of
monetisation have so far largely ignored. Yet, it can be
solved over time - the bureaucratic management of
monetisation can be 'learned'.
ii Absorptive Capacity
The second challenge is absorptive capacity. In many
developing countries, there are fewer easy outlets for
project food aid sales than advocates of monetisation
have assumed. Markets are covered either by
commercial import or by concessional or grant
programme food aid. Selling programme food aid is
usually a straightforward transaction, made through
established trade connections and friendly business
partners, mostly for the purpose of balance-of-
payments aid and thus without much concern for local
resale prices. Sometimes, low resale prices are even
of counterpart funds is set out in WFP (1983), WFP (1987a) and
WFP (l987b).
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Figure 1: Project Food Aid: Distribution in Kind Versus Monetisation
Conditions under which MONE TISA TION
is the preferred option
The objective of the project is a general income
transfer, not specific food supplementation;
where food supplementation is the objective,
cash funds can be reliably expected to be
transferred to food expenditures.
Targeting within households (e.g. to women or
children) is possible using cash transfers.
Social traditions require remuneration in cash.
Food is available to buy: local food markets or
distribution mechanisms (e.g. fair price shops)
function, or can be expected to adjust or be
established in response to increased purchasing
power; there are no serious distortions in local
food markets.
Government bureaucratic managerial capacity is
adequate for deposit/transfer/expenditure/
auditing of cash funds; no particular risk of
diversion of funds.
Additionality of cash payments and their
targeting on the poor assured or possible to
arrange without violating Government
budgetary/fiscal policies or procedures.
Cash-supplementation of specific target groups
(e.g. civil-service staff) acceptable; no
particular dependency/phase-out problems that
argue against cash; risk of undesirable taste
changes through direct distribution of food.
Monetisation, i.e. arrangements for sale and
deposit/programming/auditing of cash funds,
more cost-effective than distribution in kind.
Conditions under which DISTRIBUTION IN
KIND is the preferred option
The project objective is an increase in food
intake which will not result from cash transfers.
Targeting within households can only be
successful with food.
Social traditions allow remuneration in kind.
Food is unavailable (drought, civil disturbance,
inadequate logistics, seasonal shortage) or over-
priced (traders making supranormal profits or
not serving remote areas); and government
interventions using food aid cannot improve the
functioning of the market.
Government bureaucratic managerial capacity is
more suited to handling food in kind than cash
funds; risk of diversion of food less than of
funds.
Additionality and targeting on the poor more
easily assured for food than for cash, given
Government budgetary/fiscal policies or
procedures.
Government prefers food as a temporary
addition (topping-up) to e.g. civil service
salaries, rather than cash; food is preferred
because it is easier to phase-out, particularly
during structural adjustment programmes; no
risk of taste changes through distribution of
food.
The cost-effectiveness of direct distribution
(overall administrative/logistical costs against
net local value of food transferred) is more
favourable than monetisation.
intended by recipient governments as a form of general
food subsidy, or in order to assure easy profits of state
industries, with little regard to the disincentive effect
on local farmers. In fact, most programme food aid
donors do not care much for the counterpart funds.
Monetisation is quite a different thing for donors of
project food aid: they have to be concerned with local
prices (in order to avoid disincentives and to maximize
the level of generated funds), but they have less easy
37
access to local markets. Government parastatals are
understandably reluctant to handle ad-hoc, but usually
small quantities of sometimes not standard commercial
commodities, and they are even more reluctant to pay
what the project donor may consider a reasonably fair
price (i.e. more or less the c.i.f. price): programme aid
donors maybe waiting in the wings to oblige with much
lower prices, unless they have already fully saturated
the market needs (and have done so at a much more
opportune time than the project food aid donor may
have chosen, having had to coordinate his sale with the
cash-requirements of his project). Private traders will
be influenced by much the same considerations. In any
event, as long as the price is not 'right', direct
distribution of food will often appear as the more easily
defensible alternative.
iii The Self-Targeting Quality of Food
But there is more to this rediscovery of the merits of
direct food distribution. It has to do with a better
understanding of food insecurity, and more deliberate
targeting of project food aid on the food insecure. This
is the third challenge. In a nutshell: where people are
food insecure, this may be because they are powerless;
powerless people, however, may be reachable more
safely with food than with cash. It is this aspect of
effective targeting that the monetisation debate has so
far failed to address. With growing concern for
targeting poverty alleviation as its most immediate
objective, the much-claimed 'self-targeting' potential
of food aid turns out to be a real advantage.
Take three practical examples, chosen from currently
operational WFP projects:
Example 1: Labour-intensive drainage work in slums
outside Lusaka/Zambia, targeted at the poorest
women. Remuneration is entirely in food. Cash might,
theoretically, seem preferable to the women, giving
them a greater flexibility in expenditure. However, in
the unanimous judgement of all project authorities,
many women would not be allowed to manage cash
earnings, which would be claimed by husbands or male
heads of households.
Example 2: Building of rural water reservoirs (Hafirs)
in Kordofan/Sudan. Work, mostly manual excavation
and transport of earth, is carried out by men and
women. Because of soaring food prices (due to
drought), remuneration with family food rations is
much preferred to cash.
Example 3: A school-lunch programme for primary
schools in the arid and thinly populated areas of
Namibia. Most of the schools could probably manage
to procure the necessary maizemeal locally. However,
given the near-total absence of banks, fairly large (and
for local traditions quite exorbitant) amounts of money
would have to be delivered, deposited, handled, and
accounted for in cash, which school principals would be
unwilling and probably unable to do. Delivery to them
of food in kind is the only realistic option.
The list of examples can be lengthened and the range of
the argument broadened (see Figure 1). Food
distribution in kind can be practical for a great variety
of reasons: certain low-status commodities may have an
intended self-targeting effect; food may be physically
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unavailable in a project area which private traders will
not reliably serve; inflation or unrealistic exchange
rates may reduce the sales proceeds to unreasonably
low levels; cash payments to beneficiaries may create
unwarranted expectations of permanent entitlement
more easily than food will; or the delivery systems for
food (transport, storage, handling, accounting) although
physically awkward, may correspond more closely to
the existing administrative structures and skills of the
project authorities than the handling of cash would;
and they may correspond better also to the traditional
perceptions of control, including, not least, control by
the beneficiaries themselves. Indeed, control is a
central theme of the debate: sound bureaucratic
management, 'fair' pricing of sales, effective targeting
of the counterpart funds - all involve control. And
food is, under practical conditions in many developing
countries, often more safely controlled than cash. It is,
therefore, not really surprising that food aid agencies
such as WFP prefer to continue in their traditional
mode of operation, particularly in a field - alleviation
of poverty and hunger - in which the needs are so
great and the room for manoeuvre should therefore be
wide enough.
3 THE FUTURE CHALLENGE
But is it surprising? The three examples given earlier in
defence of the traditional approach also illustrate its
limitations: high logistic costs, need for complex
organizational back-up, and resulting from these,
almost inevitably a small size of projects, too small and
too isolated to make a significant impact. One can easily
imagine each of the three projects on a much larger
scale, if they were integrated components of a
supportive social policy, which would rely on market
mechanisms for targeting and in which the traditional
'self-targeting' quality of food would then lose its edge.
In short, one could easily imagine the three projects
being financed through programme food aid.
Thinking in this direction was particularly evident at
the January 1991 IDS Workshop, with its strong
leaning on the integration of food aid into the overall
development strategy of the recipient countries
(Maxwell and Owens ibid). Rather than targeting food
in kind to the poor, or even creating counterpart funds
for the financing of poverty projects, the workshop
recommended 'budgetary dialogue' between donor and
recipient, and resulting from it, the integration of food
aid into the budgetary process for the sustained
financing of poverty alleviation programmes, i.e.
ultimately a new kind of enlightened programme aid.
Targeted transfer of food in kind was seen by many
participants as perhaps having some legitimacy as a
humanitarian NGO-type operation, but it was no
longer in their eyes a serious form of development
assistance.
As things stand, this position reflects more a future
hope than the present reality, and those at the
workshop who advocated it, had indeed little to show in
the way of practical application. In theory, programme
food aid may today be tuned better to macro-economic
policíes than it was in the past, but this requires a level
and quality of political/administrative coordination
which is in practice seldom achieved: common
counterpart funds, for instance, although proven to be
effective, require too high political and managerial
efforts to have moved beyond the idea stage in more
than a few cases. Programme food aid is not, or not yet,
an effective instrument for the financing and
management of targeted poverty alleviation. To make it
into such an instrument will require a more active
involvement, financial and managerial, on the part of
donors in the development and implementation of
targeted poverty alleviation ('safety net') programmes;
and it will require a stronger concern for household
poverty alleviation on the part of governments. In fact,
it sometimes looks as if both approaches, programme
and project food aid, are today striving from different
starting points towards the same goal: to contribute
more effectively and in a more sharply targeted manner
to poor people's food security. As long as the current
programme food aid does not move clearly ahead of
project food aid in this competition, the latter will
continue to have a legitimate role and the only question
is whether its effectiveness can be raised.
All parties agree that the effectiveness of project food
aid should be raised. The traditional approach of
distribution in kind is not wrong, but it is unnecessarily
narrow, and this reduces the effectiveness of project
food aid as a resource for improving food security.
Targeting of selected foods on selected groups of
beneficiaries is inevitably costly, and gets more so as the
targeting improves in precision. Many traditional
projects are from the point of cost-effectiveness,
dubious. Apart from the sheer costs (which can be
borne partly or in full, by donors), the traditional
approach, with its dual line of resourcing and the
resulting need for coordination between the two, makes
extra claims on that scarcest of developing countries'
rsources - bureaucratic management. In this way it
discriminates against the poorest countries with the
weakest administrations - most of them cannot
manage more than a few projects at a time, too small
and scattered to raise food security on any scale. In
short: insistence on direct distribution as the only
delivery mechanism for project food aid limits the
absorptive capacity of the developing countries for
what can be a valuable and massively available resource
for them. Drawing on the list of criteria proposed in
Figure 1, project food aid is today, and indeed should
be, limited to the type of situations described on the
right of the list. Monetisation would open up new room
for manoeuvre in situations of the type described on the
left of the list.
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This is the immediate and practical argument for
monetisation. A second argument is more theoretical
and speculative - it has to do with the changing
philosophy of aid. Distribution of food in kind to
selected beneficiaries is a highly interventionist
approach and never entirely free of paternalistic
overtones (here again, the three examples given earlier
are probably cases in point). However, considering the
growing distrust of development theorists for blue-
print design, regulation and control, and their
preference for market mechanisms as a potential tool
even for household targeting, it may well be that the
traditional approach of distribution in kind will be seen
increasingly as going 'against the grain'. Project food
aid agencies should prepare for this development by
deliberately increasing the share of monetisation in
their programmes as fast as they reasonably can.
Provided the targeting can be assured, any transfer of
project food aid management to the market should, in
principle be considered as desirable, and no project
food aid agency should allow itself to leave existing
potential for monetisation unused. The rule should
indeed be: 'Define the targeting criteria for alleviation
of food-security - but then monetise as much as
possible - distribute in kind as little as necessary'.
4 PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS
What does this mean in practice? I see two areas for
change, one immediate and one longer term.
The immediate concern should be to review the
traditional projects, operational and in the pipeline, for
potential monetisation more systematically than this is
so far done, in the light of the three constraints - or
challenges - outlined earlier. The conscious choice
between the two alternatives, i.e. distribution in kind or
monetisation, should become a routine element of
project identification, design and operation, so that
potential scope for monetisation is no longer
overlooked. Admittedly, that scope will probably
initially be smaller than the advocates of monetisation
had hoped for: my prediction is that, if checked against
one or the other of the criteria proposed (see Figure 1),
distribution in kind will indeed turn out to be
preferable in many of the current projects. But the test
should nevertheless be made in all cases.
The second innovation is of a longer-term nature.
Project food aid agencies should seek a new generation
of projects, in which larger amounts of food aid are
targeted on food-insecure households, but in ways in
which monetisation, i.e. reliance on local markets,
would support rather than jeopard'ze the effective
targeting. Among the reasons which explain the self-
targeting capacity of food is really a not-so-positive
feature of the traditional projects, namely their small
size and short or uncertain duration. They remain
below the threshold which, for governments, would
make the establishment of cash-targeting mechanisms
worthwhile. The three examples given earlier for
projects in which food is preferable to cash, illustrate
this point.
What could this new generation of projects look like?
One avenue that should be explored is that of much
larger public work programmes, which, financed from
food aid counterpart funds, would provide employment
not to narrowly and ad-hoc selected target groups, but
as part of a mainstream social policy, to more broadly
defined poor and food-insecure groups of the
population. The Maharashtra employment guarantee
scheme comes to mind as an example in which the offer
of employment is itself self-targeting rather than the
wage good, which in this case is cash (Drèze 1991).
Large-scale public works will probably be among those
programmes in which cash funds derived from
monetisation can be targeted on poor people most
effectively and with the relatively greatest assurance of
proper administration. They will also have the
advantage that the costs of technical support and
supervision could be financed from the same source,
which in the case of the traditional food-for-work
usually constitutes a severe constraint. In short, among
the traditional approaches, cash-for-work programmes
may hold the greatest potential for massive growth.
It seems to me, another avenue to be explored is the
much more systematic use of local NGOs for the
targeting of food aid to a great variety of human
resources development activities. In many developing
countries, the awareness of the need for a minimum of
social services as a condition for healthy economic
development seems to be growing at a time when the
public financing and administrative capacity of this
sector is weakening - structural adjustment itself
seems to have this contradictory effect of bringing to
light a legitimate need while withdrawing the means for
meeting it. NGOs today appear to be developing into a
force that can take on the function of public services,
provided that governments create the policy environ-
ment in which NGOs can work. Where this is the case,
food aid can be an important source of their financing.
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